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This work was originally published at WPES 2020
[20]. Contrary to the original version’s claim, the
Dropping-Bound needs to corrupt the receiver to be
able to distinguish the real message from dummy mes-
sages, which could be applied link-based. Further,
Figure 3 contained a shift in the axis labeling. Both
is corrected in this version.
Abstract
Communicating anonymously comes at a cost – and
large communities have been in a constant tug-of-
war between the development of faster protocols,
and the improvement of security analyses. Thereby
more intricate privacy goals emerged and more de-
tailed bounds on the minimum overhead necessary
to achieve them were proven. The entanglement of
requirements, scenarios, and protocols complicates
analysis, and the published results are hardly com-
parable, due to deviating, yet specific choices of as-
sumptions and goals (some explicit, most implicit).
In this paper, we systematize the field by harmo-
nizing the models, comparing the proven performance
bounds, and contextualizing these theoretical results
in a broad set of proposed and implemented sys-
tems. By identifying inaccuracies, we demonstrate
that the attacks, on which the results are based, in-
deed break much weaker privacy goals than postu-
lated, and tighten the bounds along the way. We
further show the equivalence of two seemingly alter-
native bounds. Finally, we argue how several assump-
tions and requirements of the papers likely are of lim-
ited applicability in reality and suggest relaxations
for future work.
1 Introduction
Anonymous Communication Networks (ACNs) have
been developed, and their underlying concepts and
properties have been investigated throughout the last
30 years. Improvements to the protocols often aim at
better performance, but are also guided by progres-
sively sophisticated attacks. Those improvements are
still of utmost importance. Millions of users1 rely on
the protection of Tor [13], even though attacks are
known [23, 4, 1].
Identifying fundamental limits of this trade-off be-
tween performance and privacy can greatly aid devel-
opers in their design of new protocols. It is, however,
a challenging task, as the analyzed system, the do-
main of possible adversaries, and even the definition
of anonymity in itself are complex.
All existing formal analyses concluded that a pro-
hibitively high overhead is necessary to achieve prov-
able anonymity. This consistently pessimistic mes-
sage does not help the developers of ACNs much. To
really understand, assess, and make use of the bounds
on the efficiency of provable ACNs, the complex the-
oretical proofs have to be investigated in depth, com-
pared, and considered from a practical viewpoint.
With this paper we help to close the gap between
the theoretical proofs and their practical ramifica-
tions. The corresponding papers frequently are very
technical and mostly missing practical perspectives.
They employ various notations, define different mod-
els, and address diverse privacy goals (although all
are called anonymity) under a large variety of as-
sumptions on the users, their behavior, and adversary


























we need to show which claim on necessary overheads
comes with which choice of requirements and assump-
tions.
Thus, we systematize the underlying properties of
the existing analyses and make their results more ac-
cessible. This requires to examine the assumed adver-
sary models, and the privacy goals that are explicitly
claimed, as well as those that actually are analyzed,
given several implicit restrictions. Implicit assump-
tions on the protocols and sending behavior have to
be made explicit, to allow for comparison.
In the last part of this process, we finally investi-
gate and compare all bounds, as proven in the papers.
They all break certain privacy goals, and prove the
minimum overhead that is necessary to prevent the
considered attack. Our research initially reveals, that
the situation actually is worse, than the papers pro-
claim: The presented attacks indeed break privacy
goals that are much weaker than what the studies
target. We hence tighten the derived bounds, and, in
one case, discover that the necessary overhead is even
higher than concluded by the authors. Further, we
discover the equivalence of two bounds, which have
different perspectives on the domain.
We put those conclusions into perspective, as we
contextualize the given notions and bounds within a
broad field of actual and proposed anonymous com-
munication networks.
Finally, we discuss how specific details of the mod-
els and assumptions, which are chosen either to sim-
plify analysis or to express theoretical worst cases,
are causing the minimum overhead to be very high.
Extracting these peculiarities, we identify the chal-
lenges for future research on bounds: more realistic
user behavior and relaxed assumptions.
In brief, this paper provides the following contri-
butions:
• setting out, tightening, harmonizing and com-
paring the fundamental concepts of the different
bounds:
– the underlying attacks,
– the implicit privacy goals,
– the required adversarial capabilities,
– the deviating protocol assumptions, and
– the derived bounds;
• proving two seemingly different bounds equiva-
lent,
• discussing implications on real protocols, and
• suggesting improvements for the formal analy-
ses, to provide more applicable, and convincing
insights on the actual cost of anonymity on the
Internet.
Outline Section 2 contains the background and
Section 3 an overview of the (tightened) bounds,
while Section 4 compares the bounds in detail. Sec-
tion 5 sheds light on their relation to proposed ACNs
and Section 6 explains limitations from a practical
viewpoint. Section 7 concludes the paper. Further,
the Appendix contains formal details for the privacy
definitions, the argumentation for the tightening of
the bounds, tables to summarize the notation and re-
sults, technical parts of the proofs, information about
receiver privacy and related results in slightly differ-
ent research areas.
2 Background
In this section, we first introduce the ACN setting
and explain the basic techniques used for building
ACNs. Thereafter, we give a first, rough idea how
bounds are shown. Further, we introduce the formal-
ization needed for our extensive comparison: privacy
goal definitions and our notation.
2.1 ACN Background
While encryption is a well known measure to protect
the content of messages, packet switched networks
leak other properties that require protection. For ex-
ample the sender and receiver of a communication
should be hidden from profiling attempts of compa-
nies. Anonymous Communication (AC) tries to solve
this challenge.
We discuss AC in the setting of multiple uni-
cast communications, like several client-server appli-
cations or messaging between users on the internet.
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Every communication is a message that is sent from
a sender, possibly forwarded by intermediate nodes,
and finally received at the receiver. Such ACNs con-
sist of nodes playing two roles; users (senders and re-
ceivers) and service providers (intermediate nodes).
Participants in some systems play both roles for dif-
ferent communications. We distinguish between the
integrated system model, where the receiver is part
of the ACN and acts according to the ACN pro-
tocol, and the service model, where messages are
anonymized as a service and the receiver, e.g. web-
server, can be completely unaware of the ACN.
Depending on the use case, the privacy goals and
assumed adversaries differ. A common privacy goal
is to hide some behavior of a sender, e.g. who sent a
certain message, or how often a sender sends. This is
usually achieved by hiding the sender among others.
This set of users who are possible senders is called the
anonymity set. Other than protecting the sender it
can be a goal to protect the receiver or sender-receiver
relationships.
Typical adversary models assume a global passive
adversary, who eavesdrops on all links, or constrained
versions limited to only a subset of links. Passively
corrupted receivers, or intermediate nodes, which ad-
ditionally leak their keys to the adversary, are a com-
mon extension. Stronger models even allow the ad-
versary to modify, drop, insert and delay packets at
the controlled parts of the network.
2.2 ACN Techniques
We explain the conceptual ideas to achieve a privacy
goal roughly and refer the reader to [14, 28] for de-
tailed surveys.
2.2.1 Indirection
Onion routing [16] and mix networks [6] hide which
sender has sent a certain message to whom, by relay-
ing it over multiple hops. Applying layered encryp-
tion or shuffling of messages (in the case of mix net-
works), they ensure unlinkablity of incoming and out-
going messages at honest intermediate nodes. They
protect against passive adversaries that corrupt some
receivers and intermediate nodes. Extensions provide
protection against stronger adversaries.
2.2.2 Superposition
DC-Nets [5] implement superposition to broadcast
one message per round without leaking which of the
participants is the sender, as any participant is send-
ing a part necessary to recover the message. How-
ever, sending more than one message per round leads
to collisions of messages and none of them are in-
terpretable. Thus, a collision avoidance scheme is
usually assumed.
Private information retrieval (PIR) [8] allows to
request and deliver an entry of a database with-
out disclosing which entry was requested. Using
e.g. superposed shares of data, it allows a receiver
to anonymously request messages that are stored
at a database, thus protecting the recipient’s pri-
vacy. Some approaches reverse the idea to protect
the senders.
2.2.3 Dummy messages
Dummy messages do not transmit useful informa-
tion. They instead are sent to hide sending of “real
messages”, which contain useful information for a re-
ceiver. Dummy messages are sent randomly, or sys-
tematically according to user synchronization, and
later dropped by some part of the protocol, usually
an intermediate node or the receiver.
2.3 Privacy Goals
To sort the bounds on anonymity, we need a better
understanding of what “anonymity” actually means
in each case. Following the formal definitions of [18],
we will distinguish the following forms of anonymity
in this work:
Communication Unobservability (CŌ): Anything
regarding the communications, even how many com-
munications are happening, has to be hidden from
the adversary.
Receiver Unobservability (RŌ): Everything about
the receivers, including any information about how
many message they received, is hidden. The senders
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and their messages however can be learned by the
adversary.
Sender Unobservability (SŌ): Everything about
the senders, including any information about how
many messages they sent, is hidden. The receivers
and their messages however can be learned by the
adversary.
Sender-Message Unlinkability2 ((SM)L̄): Only the
fact that a message and its sender belong together
is hidden. Therefore, for any two (honest) senders,
even if the adversary knows that one of these sus-
pects sent a certain message, she cannot tell which of
the two senders it was. Besides many other things,
this allows that the adversary learns which sender
sends how many messages and to whom each sender
is communicating.
Sender-Receiver Unlinkability2 ((SR)L̄): Only the
fact that a sender and receiver communicate with
each other is hidden. Therefore, for any two (hon-
est) senders, even if the adversary knows that one of
these suspects communicates with a certain receiver,
she cannot tell which of the two senders it is. Be-
sides many other things, this allows that the adver-
sary learns which sender sends how often and which
sender sends which messages.
We refer the interested reader to Appendix A and
[18] for a formal definition and note that all our com-
parisons and improvements work similarly on the un-
derlying formal model.
3 Bounds Overview
To increase the privacy of otherwise unprotected
communication, ACN techniques necessarily create
overhead. The dominating strategy to prove that a
minimum amount of overhead is needed to achieve
a privacy goal is based on attacks: According to as-
sumptions and protocol requirements the attack is
argued to succeed, unless the protocol creates a cer-
tain amount of overhead.
We consider the protocol assumptions, privacy
goal, adversary model, the attack idea and the de-
rived performance bound as fundamental details of
2(SM)L̄ is called Pair-Sender-Message Unlinkability,
(SR)L̄: Pair-Sender-Receiver Unlinkability in [18].
each bound.
Analyzing the proofs in the reports, we realized
that their minimum amount of overhead is already
necessary to achieve much weaker privacy goals for
weaker adversaries than claimed in the works, and
hence we tightened the bounds (and in one case cor-
rect the necessary overhead). Appendix B describes
this analysis in detail. Here we mention the improve-
ments only briefly and then use the improved results
throughout the rest of this paper.
Further, we limit ourselves to explain the sender
goal based bounds in the main part and refer the
interested reader to Appendix E for a discussion of
receiver goals and to Appendix F for distantly related
considerations on overhead.
In this section, we give a high-level overview of
the bounds in order of increasing strength of privacy
notions that they actually relate to. Their details
are discussed as part of the comparison in the next
section.
3.1 Dropping-Bound [2]
We call this bound “Dropping-Bound” because the
attack relies on dropping packets.
Protocol Assumptions
The bound only considers onion routing and mix net-
works. It relies on the implicit assumption that mes-
sages are successfully delivered with high probability.
Privacy Goal: (SR)L̄
The report analyses for the strongest possible goal
CŌ. The bound, however, already applies for one of
the weakest notions, (SR)L̄. It defines that for any
two (honest) senders the adversary must not learn
which of them communicated with which of two re-
ceivers. Except this, she can learn anything, includ-
ing e.g. how often each sender sends. Note that
she can especially learn the fact that both candidate
senders communicated with one of the two receivers,
but not who communicated with whom.
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Adversary Model
The paper states the assumption of active adver-
saries. Note, that the only necessary activity is to
drop packets, though: The adversary can drop pack-
ets on the links of at least one sender and can observe
at at least one receiver. Further, the adversary knows
that this receiver expects a packet3.
Attack
The adversary chooses a candidate sender, drops as
many messages sent by this sender as she can, and
observes whether an expected message still arrives at
the receiver, or not. She guesses her victim to be the
real sender if no message arrives, and the alternative
sender if it does.
Bound
Preventing this attack requires some overhead, which
we can measure in added bandwidth and latency.
Sending increasing numbers of redundant messages
over alternative first hops requires higher bandwidth,
but it improves the likelihood of delivery, as it re-
duces the chance that all paths start with adversarial
links. Choosing longer paths increases latency but
also the chance of an alternative message to be re-
layed through the victim sender and subsequently
dropped by the adversary. This terminally reduces
the accuracy of the adversary’s guess4.
The precise bound, which we discuss later, follows
from calculating the adversary’s advantage given an
assumed cost.
3.2 Trilemma [11]
The “Trilemma” bound claims that only two out of
three desirable properties can be achieved in con-
junction: low bandwidth overhead, low delays, and
3This is due to the formal definition of the privacy goal.
Practically, we can however understand this as external in-
formation the adversary gained, e.g. because the application
requires a stream of messages.
4Note that this assumes an integrated system model, in
which users also act as intermediate nodes.
strong5 anonymity .
Protocol Assumptions
The analysis assumes only a single receiver, and two
suspect senders. All messages are delivered in at most
lmax rounds after sending.
Further, it considers protocol to use a fixed amount
of real and dummy messages per round. Two differ-
ent user behaviors are specified: In the synchronized
model one sender is assumed to send its real message
and all other users synchronize to decide who sends
dummy messages in this round. In the unsynchro-
nized model, any sender sends their real message in
the current round with the fixed probability p′ and
dummy messages with the fixed probability β.
Although no restriction in the type of protocol is
made explicit, we expect the bound to hold only for
onion routing and mix networks, as at least one in-
termediate node is assumed.
Privacy Goal: (SM)L̄
While the report discusses SŌ, the Trilemma already
applies for one of the weakest notions (SM)L̄. It de-
fines that for any two (honest) senders the adversary
cannot know which of them sent which message. Ex-
cept this, the adversary can learn anything, including
e.g. how often each sender sends. Note that she can
especially learn the fact that both candidate senders
sent a message, but not who sent which message.
Adversary Model
The Trilemma distinguishes two models:
The “non-compromising”6 adversary: The at-
tacker controls the receiver and the links adjacent
to the two suspected senders.
The compromising adversary The adversary addi-
tionally fully controls some intermediary nodes.
5We show in App. B.3 that it also holds for a weaker
definition of provable anonymity.
6This name is used to distinguish it from the compromis-




The paper discusses two ways of identifying the real
sender upon reception of a message at the corrupted
receiver.
The non-compromising adversary: First, the at-
tacker monitors the sending behavior of both sus-
pected challenge users. If one user has not sent any
message (real/dummy) within the lmax rounds before
the considered message is received, the other must be
the sender.
The compromising adversary: In addition to the
attack above, the adversary follows a second strat-
egy: With some probability she is able to observe all
hops of either the challenge message, or the message
sent by the alternative sender. She then can identify
the sender-message pair and tell the sender of the
challenge message.
Bound
Increasing either latency or bandwidth helps prevent-
ing these attacks: Sending dummy messages at higher
probabilities translates to a larger set of candidate
users that might have sent the message, and thus a
better chance that the alternative suspect is in it. In-
creasing the number of hops, and hence the latency,
reduces the chance of all intermediate nodes being
corrupt, and also increases the interval during which
the message may have been sent, which again trans-
lates to a larger set of candidate senders.
The precise bound follows from calculating the
probabilities of the above mentioned events in which
the adversary can unambiguously identify the sender,
subject to the assumed bandwidth and latency over-
head.
3.3 Counting-Bound [15]





No information about any sender can leak. This in-
cludes for example that even if someone sent all mes-
sages, the adversary does not know whether or not
she sent any message at all.
Adversary Model
The honest, but curious adversary corrupts all re-
ceivers and the links of at least one honest sender.
Attack
The Counting-Bound’s privacy goal implies that all
participating senders could have sent all real mes-
sages. The attacker now attempts to exclude at least
one of them, by counting the number of messages
they are sending. Knowing the number of real mes-
sages that are received (as the adversary controls the
receivers), the adversary can exclude any sender who
sent less messages.
Bound
The protocol cannot deliver more real messages to
corrupt receivers than any sender sends in real and
dummy messages.
3.4 Optimality-Bound [17]
We call this bound “Optimality-Bound” because it is
included in Hevia and Miccianchio’s proof that their
way of adding dummy messages is optimal from a
performance point of view.
Protocol Assumptions





The adversary observes the links of at least one hon-
est sender and knows how many real messages will
be sent in total7.
Attack
The adversary again tries to infer that some user did
not send all real messages. Therefore, she counts the
number of messages each sender sends and concludes
that this sender cannot have sent all, if the number
is less than the total amount of messages.
Bound
Each sender has to send as many (real and dummy)
messages as real messages will be sent.
4 Comparison
We first compare the Counting-Bound and
Optimality-Bound, to find that they only differ
in small nuances. After that we compare the
remaining bounds, aspect by aspect.
4.1 Counting-Bound and Optimality-
Bound are equivalent
Both bounds arise from the same argument: Consid-
ering a number of real messages that have been sent,
anybody who sent less messages in total cannot have
sent them all.
Protecting the privacy hence requires generating
enough dummy messages to ensure that every sender
sends as many times as real messages are delivered
by the protocol.
While the privacy goal and resulting bound are
identical (see Appendix C.1), the authors of the two
bounds looked at this from slightly different angles:
The Counting-Bound does not have any assumptions
on the protocol, but instead requires that the receiver
is corrupted, such that the adversary can count the
7This is due to the formal definition of the privacy goal. For
practical reasons, we might however also think of this as exter-
nal information the adversary gained through another channel.
delivered messages. The Optimality-Bound however
does not corrupt the receiver, but instead silently as-
sumes that all messages are delivered and exploits the
fact that the adversary knows how many real mes-
sages are sent in total. Therefore, the adversary triv-
ially also learns the number of delivered messages.
Both derive the same bound, but their conclu-
sions differ correspondingly: The Counting-Bound
limits the number of delivered messages, while
the Optimality-Bound requires the senders to send
enough dummy messages.
We continue to use the Counting-Bound as repre-
sentative for both.
4.2 Protocol Assumptions
The papers state, but also silently make assumptions
regarding sending behavior, delivery guarantees, and
supported protocols.
4.2.1 Sending Behavior
The Counting-Bound and Dropping-Bound8 make no
assumption about the distribution of sending events
per round. The Trilemma however considers a spe-
cific sending behavior with fixed amounts dummy and
real messages per round, and their synchronized and
unsynchronized sending model.
4.2.2 Delivery Guarantees
The Counting-Bound does not consider a maximum
delivery delay. As only 1n of the sent messages
(dummy and real) reach their destination, some mes-
sages might not be delivered.
The Dropping-Bound silently assumes successful
message delivery. Missing messages otherwise could
not be interpreted as successful attacks by the adver-
sary, but they could be an artifact of the protocol.
The Trilemma assumes a maximum delay the net-
work adds. Note that in the synchronized setting this
guarantees that all messages can successfully be sent
and received, as users get assigned one of n rounds
8This is not to be confused with the assumptions for the
protocol proposed in the same paper [2], where the messages
are sent at the same point in time.
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to send their message into the network. The unsyn-
chronized setting in contrast does not provide this
kind of certainty, since a user can only send her mes-
sage based on the result of a coin flip. Therefore,
in every round there is some probability that a cer-
tain user has not been able to send their message
yet (even though this probability is negligible after
enough rounds).
4.2.3 Protocol types
The Counting-Bound applies to all types of ACN pro-
tocols, as it only considers the number of sent and re-
ceived messages. The Dropping-Bound, in contrast,
only applies to onion routing and mix networks.
The Trilemma states that no protocol with a min-
imal latency of lmax = 1 can achieve their privacy
goal, as the resulting advantages of their attack are
non-negligible9. However, there exist protocols with
this minimal latency achieving even stronger privacy
notions against the considered adversary model, like
the secure multi-party computation protocol as dis-
cussed in [15] or the well-known DC-Net, which is
proven to achieve a stronger notion than targeted by
the Trilemma in [15]. The authors recognize this lim-
itation in later work [12], and we suspect their bound
to apply only to ACNs following the onion routing or
mix network paradigms.
4.3 Privacy Goals
Although all bounds claim to hold for the privacy goal
“anonymity”, the protection at which their overhead
becomes necessary differs.
The Counting-Bound targets SO, the strongest
goal of these analyses10. It is a very strong notion
that protects not only the linking of sender-message
and sender-receiver pairs, but even the frequency of
sending, which for instance after a critical event could
jeopardize the sender’s safety.
Both other bounds target weaker notions with no
direct relation to each other. The Trilemma considers
9δ ≥ 1
2
for the unsynchronized and δ ≥ 1 for the synchro-
nized setting (see Appendix D.3)
10It is called “sender anonymity” in [17] and is shown to map
directly to SŌ in [18].
(SM)L̄, which only prevents linking sender-message
pairs, while the notion of the Dropping-Bound only
prevents linking sender-receiver pairs ((SR)L̄). Both
allow the adversary to succeed in linking other prop-
erties, and allow to learn, for example, the number of
real messages each user has sent.
To visualize the extent of the difference, note that
the hierarchy provided by [18] actually defines mul-
tiple other privacy goals, which do not further need
in this work, in between the ones targeted by the





Figure 1: Excerpt of the hierarchy of [18] with the pri-
vacy goals of the bounds highlighted. Arrows point
from stronger to strictly weaker goals.
4.4 Adversary Models
The bounds rely on different adversary models, which
we depict in Figure 2 (the comparison to the models










Figure 2: Hierarchy of adversary models. Hierarchi-
cally lower adversary model are weaker. The dotted
arrow represents the additional relation caused by ig-
noring the number of observed victims.
It is sufficient for all the attacks to compromise
or influence outgoing links or the attached relays at
the sender, as well as the receiver (or its incoming
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links/attached relays), as this enables to correlate
events at the terminals of the communication. The
adversaries in the Counting-Bound and Trilemma in
the non-compromising case are virtually identical:
one that corrupts all links of the victim sender(s)
and the receiver. Their only difference lies in the
number of victims, as the Trilemma considers two,
and the Counting-Bound only a single victim to be
monitored. The Trilemma in the compromising case
additionally allows to passively compromise some in-
termediary protocol parties, i.e. to learn their keys
and eavesdrop at them.
Only the Dropping-Bound allows the adversary to
drop messages, and hence considers an active model.
Eavesdropping capabilities on the sender links are not
strictly required, and it is at least conceivable that a
remote adversary could cause such message loss, for
example by causing congestion on targeted links. Al-
beit this model is stronger than those of the other
bounds in terms of behavior (active), it can as well
be considered weaker in terms of the needed eaves-
dropping capabilities.
Note regarding the system models
Recall that in the service model, the receiver is not
an active part of the network but an external entity
(like in Tor). Corrupting a receiver in this case can
be achieved in different ways. Beyond controlling the
receiver herself, for unencrypted traffic it suffices to
control only her network links (trivial for the ISP), or
the last node on her anonymization path. Note, that
for the Counting-Bound the traffic to the receiver can
even be encrypted as only the fact that those are real
messages is important.
We include the adversary model that only eaves-
drops on these links as service model restricted to our
comparison. It is weaker than those of the Counting-
Bound and Trilemma.
4.5 Bounds
We explain the minimun cost as inferred by the proofs
of the bounds in the following and compare them with
each other. Therefore, we unify the notation of the
different bounds as follows.
An ACN has n users. The set U includes all
senders, UH the h honest senders. If the privacy
goal challenges the adversary to decide between two
suspect senders, we call these “challenge senders u0
and u1” and u1 the “alternative user to u0”. Fur-
ther, we refer to the message of this communication
as “critical” or “challenge message”. λ is the secu-
rity parameter and δ the advantage of the adversary
in identifying the real sender.
The Trilemma requires a message to be delivered
after at most lmax rounds/hops. We additionally
write lexp for the average of the number of hops.
Further, the Trilemma assumes dummy and real
messages to be distributed uniformly over several
rounds. We use β to denote the probability that a
node sends a dummy message in a given round, p′ for
the probability of sending a real message. p = p′ + β
is the total probability that a node sends in a round.
cp (ca) is the number of intermediate nodes the
adversary compromised passively (actively).
Table 3 and 4 of the Appendix show the connection
to the original notation and summarize our notation.
4.5.1 Counting-Bound
Recall the basic idea: If a sender sends less messages
than are received, she cannot have been the sender of
all these messages. We want to prevent the adversary
from excluding any sender from the set of suspects
that could have sent all messages. Thus the number
of real messages received can be at most the total
number of messages (real and dummy) any one sender
has sent.
More formally, let Out(r) denote11 the number of
messages received by a destination until round r and
Li(r) the number of messages sent by sender ui. The
bound is
Out(r) ≤ min{Li(r)|ui ∈ UH}.
It follows that the total number of sending events
for all senders Com(r) has to be sufficiently high:
Com(r) ≥ Out(r) · |UH | = Out(r) · h
11Compared to [15], we omit additional parameters. I.e.
Out(r) is short for Outπσ,r.
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The bound shows a required overhead of at least
h− 1 dummy messages per message that reaches the
destination. In other words, h−1h of messages are
overhead because there are at least h times more
sending events than received messages. The distri-
bution of overhead during each round is flexible, as
long as the sum of the overhead compensates for all
delivered messages up to any specific round.
Note that the bound in [15] is given in the num-
ber of honest senders instead of all senders. As
the Counting-Bound’s adversary model does not in-
clude corrupted senders, both numbers are equivalent
(h = n).
4.5.2 Trilemma
The Trilemma states the trade-offs for two adver-
saries (non-compromising and compromising), and
two sending behaviors (synchronized and unsyn-
chronized) and infers areas, i.e. bandwidth-latency
combinations, where their privacy goal cannot be
achieved.
Non-compromising adversary with synchro-
nized users Recall the attack: The adversary
knows the two users out of which one has sent the
challenge message. She also knows the interval, dur-
ing which the message must have been sent. If she
does not observe the alternative user sending a mes-
sage in this interval, she knows the sender with cer-
tainty. Otherwise, she randomly accuses one of her
two suspects.
Her advantage over guessing randomly equals the
probability that the alternative user has not sent a
message within the critical interval. In the synchro-
nized setting, the probability that the alternative
user sent a message in the critical time interval of
lmax rounds, is bounded by the sum of the probabil-
ities that she sent a real message12(= lmax−2n−1 ) and
the probability that she sent a dummy message13
(≤ βn(lmax−1)n−1 ). So the bound is simply the prob-
12 number of rounds (except sending of critical message)
number of users (except real sender)
13 number of dummy messages in the rounds
number of users










(lmax − 1)(1 + βn)
n− 1
)
Comparison to Counting-Bound This is inter-
twined with the considered privacy goals and protocol
assumptions. The Counting-Bound aims at achieving
SŌ. To hide the sending frequency for the adversary
model14, everybody else has to send a dummy mes-
sage, whenever a single user is sending a real message.
The Trilemma aims at (SM)L̄, which allows the num-
ber of dummy messages to be reduced, as the sending
frequencies do not need to be hidden. Sending a real
message as alternative sender in the critical time in-
terval is enough to hide the sender-message linking,
as desired. This joint sending is reflected in the first
part of the sum ( lmax−1n−1 ) in the Trilemma for syn-
chronized users, which therefore cannot be found in
the Counting-Bound.
When we would require the latency to be minimal
for their protocol model (lmax = 2), we force the
Trilemma to only consider dummy messages of the
current round as suitable cover: As per the proto-
col assumption in synchronized sending only one real
message per round is sent and as the critical interval
is just this round, only these dummy messages con-
tribute to the hiding, just as for hiding frequencies
in the Counting-Bound. We also see this reflected in







This advantage is 0 if β = n−1n =
h−1
h ; exactly the
overhead required in the Counting-Bound.
Non-compromising adversary with unsynchro-
nized users We know that an alternative user does
not send in a specific round with probability 1 − p.
Additionally, the choice of sending in the lmax − 1
rounds is independent. We hence can bound the
14The Trilemma non-compromising and Counting-Bound’s
adversary model are the same except for the number of victims.
10
probability that a second observed user does not send
by
δ ≥ (1− p)lmax−1
(cf. Appendix B.3 for a discussion of the original
bound in this case).
Comparison to Counting-Bound The
Counting-Bound does not require the overhead
to be evenly distributed over the rounds. We
however temporarily assume so to allow for a com-
parison. Thereby the Counting-Bound requires the
probability of a user sending any (real or dummy)
message to be p = p′ + β = 1. This resembles
the improved Trilemma bound to minimal latency
and the additional effects of a higher latency can
be seen in the Trilemma, but not mapped to the
Counting-Bound; as in the case with synchronized
users.
Non-compromising adversary’s area of impos-
sibility Based on the above bounds on the advan-
tage, we can infer that for some combinations of la-
tency lmax and bandwidth overhead β the considered
attack has non-negligible advantage, i.e. the privacy
goal is broken. Such parameter combinations consti-
tute the area of impossibility.
If we e.g. assume that the message should be de-
livered after only one intermediate relay processed it,
the adversary wins unless the alternative user sends
in the same round (to this relay). Thus unless every
user sends in every round (β approaches 1), the goal
cannot be achieved for this short latency (lmax = 2).
For the other extreme case of no dummy messages
(β = 0), the adversary wins unless the alternative
user sends her real message while the challenge mes-
sage is routed. Thus unless the latency is very high
(e.g. lmax = n+ 1) and all users send their own mes-
sage in the meantime with overwhelming probability,
the privacy goal cannot be achieved.
The Trilemma makes the assumption that n ≈
poly(λ) and derives the following equations for the
synchronized setting. All parameter combinations
that fulfill them cannot achieve the privacy goal.
2(lmax − 1)β ≤ 1−
1
poly(λ)
, βn ≥ 1
For the unsynchronized setting the equations are
equal, except that β is replaced with p.
Comparison to Counting-Bound The
Counting-Bound and the area of impossibility
from the Trilemma can be transformed to the
following statements (cf. Appendix D.2):






, p = 1






, βn ≥ 1
Out(r)
r is the average number of messages delivered to
the destination in each round. We hence assume this
number not to be much lower than 1 for most proto-
cols, to retain utility.15 Also, Section 4.2.3 yields that
the Trilemma requires lmax > 1. In consequence, it
holds that 12(lmax−1) <
1
2 . This shows that the lower
bound on the bandwidth overhead of the Counting-
Bound is higher, reflecting its stricter requirements.
Compromising adversary Extending the adver-
sary to compromise up to cp ≤ n − 2 intermediate
nodes facilitates the attack of tracing messages along
their anonymization paths, if all nodes on these paths
are under adversarial control. This increases the ad-
vantage of the adversary, and the Trilemma is inter-
ested in this additional probability for an attack to
succeed. We explain how the probability is bounded
in the Appendix C.2 and only discuss the area of im-
possibility for the compromising adversary here.
If an adversary passively compromises cp < lmax−1
protocol parties, then the area of impossibility is




If the number of compromised parties is
cp ≥ lmax − 1, then anonymity cannot be reached for
2(lmax − 1)β ≤ 1−
1
poly(λ)
and lmax ∈ O(1).
15In the Trilemma [11] the number of delivered messages per
round n
n+(lmax−1)
approaches 1 for high numbers of users, for
the protocol used in the Counting-Bound the number is 1.
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Comparison to Counting-Bound We have al-
ready compared the case without compromised pro-
tocol parties. Adding them the result cannot di-
rectly be matched to the Counting-Bound (as it uses
no compromised protocol parties). We can however
again transform the impossibility area for the case of
cp < lmax − 1 to
β ≥ 1





Note, that this requires more bandwidth overhead
than without compromised intermediate nodes, as
expected. It is however still a weaker band-




2 and the Counting-Bound’s factor
(Out(r)r ) is assumed to be close to 1. For the case
of more corrupted parties, interestingly a constant
latency is no longer possible as this ensures a non-
negligible advantage that cannot be balanced with
bandwidth.
4.5.3 Dropping-Bound
Recall the idea for the Dropping-Bound: The adver-
sary has two suspects, from which one is sending to
the receiver, in which the adversary is interested in.
In her attack, she correlates her dropping of pack-
ets sent from the victim with the missing arrival of
an expected packet at the receiver. This attack is
successful unless one of two cases happens: 1) the
communication of the alternative suspect is routed
over the victim and thus the adversary wrongly ac-
cuses the victim even if the alternative suspect sends
to the receiver or 2) the adversary cannot drop all
copies of the message sent by the victim and thus
wrongly acquits the victim.
This bound measures onion cost of a user as the
expected number of packets (own and relayed mes-
sages) a user sends. The bound is based on two key
observations: 1) if the victim forwards less packets
than users exist (sublinear onion cost in the num-
ber of users) there is some user whose packet she
does not forward, and 2) if the victim sends only
few copies (logarithmic in the security parameter16)
16They implicitly assume that this is also sublinear in the
and the amount of corrupted nodes is high enough,17
the adversary can drop all copies with non-negligible
probability. Combining the two observations, the at-
tack leads to a non-negligible advantage. Thus, for
their privacy goal, the onion cost per user has to in-
crease faster than log λ, i.e. be in ω(log λ), and there-
fore the onion cost for the whole network has to be
in ω(n log λ).
Comparison The authors of the Dropping-Bound
assign the Trilemma an onion cost of ω(n), while their
own result entails ω(n · log λ) due to the “stronger”18
active adversary [2].
We cannot confirm this. The number of onions that
are directly sent, i.e. the onion cost, is the number of
onions created by all users multiplied by the rounds
they stay in the network. To be able to compare
the onion costs, we use lexp ≤ lmax as the average
latency of the protocol. The number of onions is the
number of real messages plus the number of dummy
messages. Both are multiplied with the number of
rounds messages spent in the network (lexp). Recall
for the Trilemma: β + p′ = p messages per user and
round are sent. There are n users as well as rounds
– as every user is assumed to send one message, and
only one user sends a real message per round. This
results in n2 · p messages in total that stay for lexp
hops in the network. So the onion cost per user in
the Trilemma is
n2·p·lexp
n = n ·p · lexp, or n
2 ·p · lexp for
the complete network, which is considerably higher
than a bound of ω(n) or ω(n log λ).
Considering the impossibility area, the Trilemma




The onion cost for the Counting-Bound for the










17They do not mention any requirement on the number of
corrupted nodes except that the amount is constant, but if
there are less corrupted nodes than copies of the message, she
cannot succeed by dropping messages coming directly from the
victim.
18It is not stronger in all dimensions as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4.
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Note that also the precise onion cost for Counting-
Bound is higher than for the Trilemma (since p ≤ 1,
n2 · lexp ≥ n2 · p · lexp). Both onion costs are higher
than the one for the Dropping-Bound, contrary to
the claim in [2].
Note on the Dropping-Bound in latency and
bandwidth overhead On the other hand, we can
translate the onion cost of the Dropping-Bound into a
bound on latency and bandwidth overhead under the
assumption that every message stays in the network
for the allowed latency. The resulting impossibility
area confirms the above order in costs:
p · n · lmax > log λ ⇐⇒ p >
log λ
polyλ · lmax
4.5.4 Intermediate Summary on the Over-
head Comparison
All papers discuss the influence of bandwidth over-
head on anonymity. The latency overhead is explic-
itly considered in the Trilemma and implicitly in the
Dropping-Bound. To permit a comparison between
the bounds, we transformed all bounds to account
for the differing models and assumptions. In result,
the overhead required by the Counting-Bound and
Optimality-Bound is the highest, by the Trilemma
the second highest and the Dropping-Bound, albeit
based on an active adversary, introduces the lowest
overhead.
4.6 Summary
Interestingly, even though all bounds come to sim-
ilar conclusions, their privacy goal, attacker model,
protocol assumptions and also postulated cost differ
considerably (cf. Table 1).
For the Optimality-Bound and the Counting-
Bound we realized that cost and privacy goal are
equal, and that the attacker models differ only
slightly. The differences are easily explained by
deviating protocol assumptions. Resulting, the
Optimality-Bound and Counting-Bound have the
highest cost and discuss the strongest privacy goal,
albeit in face of a comparably weak adversary
model, and without (Counting-Bound) or with mi-
nor (Optimality-Bound) restrictions on the protocol
types. Thus, protecting SŌ, which explicitly hides
which sender sends how often, against an adversary
that both observes the first link of the sender (e.g. her
ISP) and the corresponding receiver (or has external
knowledge about the number of received real mes-
sages) is indeed only possible with high bandwidth
overhead.
The papers introducing the other two bounds state
stronger, yet analyze lower privacy goals, and pos-
tulate lower cost. The Trilemma aims at unlink-
ing the sender from her message ((SM)L̄), while the
Dropping-Bound aims at unlinking pairs of senders
and their receivers ((SR)L̄). Note that while for SŌ
every sender sends a dummy message per real mes-
sage to assure that real sending frequencies are hid-
den, for (SM)L̄ (or (SR)L̄) the bandwidth can be
lower as it allows to learn that someone is a more
active sender, as long as one cannot link a certain
message (or receiver) to her. On the other hand,
compared to the Optimality-Bound and Counting-
Bound, the adversary model in the Trilemma is
slightly stronger. Interestingly, reducing the privacy
notion, but using a slightly stronger adversary model
for the Trilemma (and an incompatible adversary
model for the Dropping-Bound), allows the bounds
on the overhead to drop considerably. So, in this case
the change in the adversary model cannot outbalance
the change in the privacy goal.
The cost for unlinking sender and message in the
Trilemma is higher than unlinking sender and re-
ceiver in the Dropping-Bound although the latter
assumes an active adversary. The reasons are that
the Trilemma is tailored to this special case and that
timing observations are exploited19 in the Trilemma.
Further, the adversary in the Trilemma is not strictly
weaker than the one for the Dropping-Bound. They
indeed are incompatible, as the latter is stronger with
19Even though the Dropping-Bound argues that dropping is
the most important attack vector as a timeout causes delayed
messages to be dropped and modified onions cannot be peeled
by the next relay, we suspect that timings cannot be handled
that easily with timeouts. Even smaller delays that do not
cause a timeout might be recognizable by the adversary or
otherwise we need to timeout so early that we expect it to
threaten availability.
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Table 1: Final Bounds Summary
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after lmax rounds; onion
routing, mix nets, not ap-
plicable for DC-Nets
exclude senders that did not
send in the time where the
critical message was sent, if








, βn ≥ 1
[2] (SR)L̄ active +
receiver
delivery guaranteed (un-
less aborted), only onion
routing, mixing
drop all messages send from
the victim observe missing of
expected message at receiver
p > log λpolyλ·lmax
respect to its behavior being active, whereas the for-
mer has a larger area of control, as it can compromise
more and different parts of the network.
5 Implications
We extend the idea from [11] to contextualize our re-
sults with existing ACNs. The comparison to actual
ACN protocols of course has to be taken with grains
of salt: Exceeding the theoretical bounds in overhead
indicates that an ACN may, but not that it actually
does achieve the corresponding privacy notion. We
discuss system classes, loosely ordering them by the
extent to which they can meet the different bounds.
5.1 Discussion of Networks
Figure 3 illustrates the trade-off vs. the cost of dif-
ferent existing ACNs. We facilitate this comparison
by restricting ourselves to a specific scenario: A sin-
gle real message is assumed to be sent during each
round. The abscissa denotes the latency of messages,
and the ordinate the bandwidth overhead, as part of
the probability that a node sends a message during a
round.
We also discuss the more general cases, which are
especially interesting to assess the systems according
Table 2: Comparison of assumed sending behavior
Protocols Dummy traffic Communications Counting-
per round & user per round Bound
Herd 1 (some) n (or more) X
DC-Net, Dissent 1 1 X
Dicemix n n X
Vuvuzela 1 n X
Riffle, Riposte 0 (1) n X
to the Counting-Bound – and we give an overview on
the assumptions of the different protocols necessary
to assess this in Table 2.
5.1.1 Tor [13], HORNET [7]
This first class of low overhead onion routing systems
sends messages over a path of relays and does not em-
ploy additional dummy traffic. The number of hops
is fixed, and thus they expose constant latency.
These systems fall short of any bound. All ex-
plained attacks indeed are successful: It is simple to
link sent onions because of their timing (Trilemma),
to count the number of messages a sender sent as
sending can be observed (Counting-Bound). Know-
ing that a certain receiver expects another packet
(e.g., because the use case postulates a message
stream), dropping it right at the sender can be recog-
nized at the receiver (Dropping-Bound). This in it-























Threshold Mix Threshold Mixsec
Loopix
Figure 3: Comparison of bounds under the special set
of assumptions of the Trilemma [11] (see Table 2 for
the Counting-Bound in the general case). As [11] we
assume that β ≈ p to summarize both user settings:
The Counting-Bound requires the highest overhead
but is independent of the latency. The Trilemma
shows a trade-off between latency and bandwidth, it
is higher than the Dropping-Bound.
suggested [23] or are at least conceivable for Tor.
5.1.2 Threshold-Mix [27]
This class of mixes collects t messages before relay-
ing them further. It does not employ dummy traf-
fic. Thus, each sending event transmits a real mes-
sage, and SŌ cannot be achieved according to the
Counting-Bound. Interestingly, the approach can
however fulfill the two other bounds: If each user
sends one message and each mix waits for all of them,
and if further all mixes are used (as assumed by both
bounds if a high latency is allowed), the attacks fail.
Dropping a message yields no message to be deliv-
ered, and hence the privacy is kept (although avail-
ability is jeopardized).20 As long as we assume that
one of the mixes is honest, linking the incoming and
outgoing packets fails at this point and also timing
does not provide any help as the first mix already
waits for all messages. We do however agree with [11]
that the Trilemma and Dropping-Bound cannot be
20Threshold mixes do not employ any additional technique
to protect against the attack of the Dropping-Bound.
met for convenient thresholds and numbers of mixes.
5.1.3 Herd [22], DC-Net [5], Dicemix [26],
Dissent [31]
This class of systems employs dummy traffic but has
low latency. Herd uses multiple relays just like Tor
and HORNET, but adds dummy traffic. DC-Net,
Dicemix and Dissent in contrast follow the idea of
superposed sending. They generate the original mes-
sage as a combination of both; a real message from
one and dummy messages from all other users.
Only the Counting-Bound is applicable to these
superposed sending based systems, as both the
Dropping-Bound and the Trilemma are based on the
mixing model, which includes Herd but not systems
based on superposition.
The systems indeed meet the overhead requirement
of the Counting-Bound. Without a collision avoiding
scheme (cf. 2.2.2) DC-Nets still cannot achieve the
notion SŌ (cf. [15]). Dicemix and Dissent specify
scheduling for transmission slots by combining one
message of each user in every round. Mounting the
attack from the Counting-Bound, the receiver hence
does learn that all messages of a single round are from
different senders, and only messages distributed over
multiple rounds can be from the same sender. She
succeeds and the notion SŌ cannot be achieved in
consequence.
The situation for Herd is a bit more complex, than
the representation in Figure 3 suggests. The graph
assumes only a single communication per round, and
for this special case Herd meets all bounds as it em-
ploys enough overhead. However, Herd aims at a
VoIP scenario, which indicates that the more general
case of users participating with several communica-
tions in the same round seems more applicable. The
Counting-Bound is no longer met in this case: The
users in Herd generate a predefined amount of traf-
fic, which is supposed to at least resemble the traffic
caused by a small number of VoIP connections (e.g.
one). This does not outweigh the total number of
real messages sent during a round, and the Counting-
Bound is violated. Herd in consequence leaks some




Loopix is another mix network that adds more mixes
and dummy traffic. It allows to adjust both the num-
ber of used mixes and the dummy traffic via param-
eters. Sender traffic is generated according to an ex-
ponential distribution. Like [11] we assume
√
λ mixes
per path and dummy traffic with probability 1λ , al-
though we stress that other parameter choices are not
excluded by the paper.
Loopix in this setting satisfies nearly all bounds.
Only from the Counting-Bound, we can conclude that
it cannot achieve SŌ. We expect that also prac-
tically the two scenarios of either one user sending
many messages, or the same number of messages be-
ing sent by multiple users can be distinguished: The
messages in the first case arrive much slower at the re-
ceiver. However, aiming at SO may be too strong for
many use cases and a weaker privacy notion targeted.
Loopix does employ protection measures against the
other attacks. Confirming their effectiveness is be-
yond the scope of this paper, and we leave it for fu-
ture work.
5.1.5 Riposte [9]
Riposte uses a reversed PIR to implement an anony-
mous broadcast. Each client sends a message to the
PIR servers in the epoch during which she partici-
pates. Riposte does not apply the concept of dummy
messages21. The set of senders is published at the
end of each round.
Riposte does not lend itself to analysis with the
model of the Trilemma, as the latter assumes only a
single sender to send a real message per round, but
Riposte requires several parallel communications to
achieve any anonymity. In Figure 3 we still follow
[11] and choose the probability for every sender to
send in each epoch to be one.
Categorizing Riposte with a sending probability of
1 is misleading for the general case as not only one,
but multiple messages are sent per epoch. Similar to
Herd, the bandwidth overhead is again too small to
withstand the requirements of the Counting-Bound.
21Only for receiving an empty message is used, as messages
in the postboxes of the clients are swapped.
We can confirm this with a practical attack: By ob-
serving the number of write requests to the servers
(i.e. send events), an adversary can directly count
the number of sent messages, as no dummy traffic
is applied. Riposte clusters sending events, so they
are not spread over several rounds, and they are only
hidden among each other. Further, although the la-
tency is sufficient to fulfill the Dropping-Bound, the
dropping attack still works: Dropping all parts of the
write request of one user will not lead Riposte to stop,
but instead to publish all except this user’s message.
5.1.6 Riffle [21], Vuvuzela [30]
Vuvuzela and Riffle are mix networks that require
all messages to go trough all mixes. Alike [11], we
assume a logarithmic number of mixes. Further, Vu-
vuzela ensures a constant traffic rate by employing
dummy traffic. Riffle assumes all clients to always
have a message to send (“each client onion encrypts
a message”). So, in both protocols each client sends
in every round. Riffle additionally employs PIR to
deliver the messages after they went through a veri-
fiable shuffling mix net.
They intuitively seem to satisfy all bounds and
could possibly achieve all notions. Similar to Herd
however, multiple users can (Vuvuzela) or have to
(Riffle) send every round and we can infer that all
messages of one round have been sent by different
senders. Thus the Counting-Bound is only fulfilled
for the special case that only one user sends per
round. This case might happen, but is not enforced
in Vuvuzela, and contradicts the assumption of Riffle
that each client sends a message.
5.2 Summary
The bounds show limitations of existing ACNs, as
they cannot achieve certain privacy notions. We
managed to underline this situations with real-world
attacks on the systems. We also conclude that nearly
no system achieves SŌ nor reaches the Counting-
Bound under the given assumptions. It turns out
that the assumption of the number of real messages
sent per round is important. Not only to assess spe-
cific bounds and check for their applicability in the
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first place, but also to put the bandwidth overhead
into perspective.
It remains to state that there are cases where we
suspect that the protocols do not achieve certain pri-
vacy goals even though they reach the corresponding
bounds.
6 A Practical Viewpoint: Ex-
plaining Limitations
Arriving at this bleak outlook, we want to put the
bound into perspective.
6.1 Strong Privacy Goal Formaliza-
tions
6.1.1 The Notion SO of the Counting-Bound
SŌ is a strong notion22, which even hides the number
of active senders. While there are use cases for this
notion [18], for many proposed protocols it might be
too strong. Some protocols (cf. Section 5) aim how-
ever to protect against a similar, but weaker notion23:
They ensure that any user sends a fixed, small num-
ber of communications (real or dummy) every round.
Thereby, they allow the adversary to learn that no
user has sent more than this number of real mes-
sages, which implicitly leaks a lower bound on how
many senders have been active during a given round.
6.1.2 Game-Based Notions for Bounds
Everything that could leak in the protocol by defini-
tion of the game-based notion is assumed to be leaked
during the analysis. This is useful for worst case anal-
yses. For bounds, however, the adversary knows, per
game definition, everything that happens as long as
it is not explicitly defined to be protected. She does
not even have to be able to observe any of this in
reality.
22Note, that also much stronger notions, which require for
instance membership concealment, hiding the fact if a user
participates in the system at all, are discussed in literature.
23For a formal definition of this weaker notion see SOnmax in
Appendix A.2 and for further useful, weaker notions see [18].
Consider the Optimality-Bound: The adversary
knows how many real messages are received, without
controlling the receiver, just by the definition of the
notion. Further, the attack in the Dropping-Bound
requires her to realize that a packet is missing. In
the game-based notion, this is trivial: the adversary
knows how many messages each receiver expects, by
the definition of the notion. In reality, this limits
the applicability to use cases with predictable receiv-
ing behavior (like streaming or triggering the reaction
with rumor spreading).
Future work on bounds should therefore argue the
practicability of the underlying attack and assump-
tions. For more realistic analyses communications
unknown to the adversary and beyond her control
could be included24.
6.2 Maximal Anonymity Sets
All bounds require the anonymity set to include all
users and that even the considered attack cannot ex-
clude a single user from it. For many real use cases,
however, significantly smaller anonymity sets after an
attack may be sufficient. For example, building the
anonymity set only from the users concurrently online
(or sending) might be acceptable for the use case as
long as at any point enough users are online (or send-
ing). Determining such suitable smaller anonymity
sets will be a challenge for future work.
6.3 Bandwidth Cost Models
Different concepts are summarized under the term
“bandwidth overhead”. For the Trilemma bandwidth
overhead naturally occurs from dummy messages,
while for the Dropping-Bound redundant copies of
the real messages are needed. Further, also for
dummy messages end-to-end dummy traffic, starting
and ending at users, and link dummy traffic, which is
just applied to obscure the traffic on one hop, exist.
Interestingly, the overhead in the Counting-Bound
and Trilemma measures only in the sender-generated
dummy messages. In practice, however, end-to-end
dummy traffic puts more load on the network than
24This extension is easily achieved by adding adversary
classes [3, 18]
17
link dummy traffic at the sender’s first link. In the
Trilemma, for example, longer lasting dummy traffic
would only be necessary if corrupted relays are intro-
duced into the model. Contrary to the cost definition
of the Counting-Bound and Trilemma, the Dropping-
Bound’s can reflect a difference between end-to-end
dummy traffic and dummy traffic on the first link.
We thus prefer this cost metric for future work.
6.4 Assumptions
Relaxed assumptions are desirable for future work
on bounds to improve their applicability. In terms of
sending behavior, having more than a single user send
a real message per round, contrary to the Trilemma’s
assumption, suits reality better and naturally bene-
fits the privacy. Further, latency requirements, like
in the Trilemma, may also be more relaxed in many
practical use cases.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have systematized different analyses that prove
lower bounds on the overhead that is necessary to
achieve certain privacy goals of anonymous communi-
cation. Analyzing their assumptions we have shown
that their underlying attacks suffice to break much
weaker than the targeted privacy notions, and hence
tightened the given bounds.
Presenting the complete landscape of existing
bounds, we found that in terms of the adversary all
state global capabilities, while the actual attacks only
require local influence or observations close to both
endpoints of the communication. Only the Dropping-
Bound uses active capabilities, while the others are
strictly passive and, except for corrupted intermedi-
ate nodes, quite similar. All primarily targeted goals
protect the sender, but in different ways. While one
class (the Optimality-Bound and Counting-Bound)
analyzed the strongest notion that only focuses on
the sender, another (the Trilemma and Optimality-
Bound) actually investigated two of the weakest goals
imaginable. The first class needs no additional re-
strictions, while the second is only applicable for a
subclass of all ACNs and the Trilemma even makes
further assumptions on the sending behavior. The
resulting overhead requirements for the first class are
independent of the acceptable latency. The second
class on the other hand shows a trade-off between la-
tency and bandwidth. Stricter requirements for the
privacy protection lead to higher overhead bounds,
even though the adversary model was slightly weaker.
Also assumptions on the sending behavior and ex-
ploitation of time in the attack resulted in higher re-
quired overhead, even compared to another attack
exploiting active capabilities.
A critical assessment of the assumptions of the cor-
responding papers revealed limitations from a prac-
titioner’s perspective. They commonly require the
protocol to create a single anonymity set containing
all users, even when attacked. Some assume that
only a single real message is sent per round, and cor-
responding attacks seem harder in reality. Some pro-
posed cost metrics neglect how often messages are for-
warded on the network, and hence do not favor more
efficient link-based over end-to-end dummy traffic.
We firmly believe in the utility of treating anony-
mous communication formally, and proving corre-
sponding efficiency bounds. Our comparison allows
practitioners to take the existing knowledge of the
bounds for the specific cases in which they apply
into account. For future work on bounds, we sug-
gest to help identifying the weakest possible assump-
tions, by stating them more expressly and explain-
ing them from a practical viewpoint, and to improve
utility we suggest to consider the discussed practical
limitations, by leveraging more realistic cost models,
relaxed privacy goals and more realistic assumptions
about sending behavior and prior knowledge of the
adversary.
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A Formal Privacy Definitions
A.1 Basic Goal Formalization
from [18]
In game-based security definitions, the game adver-
sary chooses two batches, i.e. sets of communications
that start in a random order (or simultaneously). The
challenger picks one of them at random, simulates it,
and provides observations to the adversary, accord-
ing to the protocol and adversary model. This pro-
cess can be repeated. The game adversary finally
has to guess, which batches were chosen, based on
her observations. If the adversary learns any infor-
mation that was required to be hidden, she will be
able to distinguish the scenarios25 and to guess cor-
rectly. Thus, her advantage in the game, i.e. the
improvement of her success probability over random
guessing, is non-negligible. The required privacy is
hence not achieved, and the notion is considered to
be broken.
We can vary this game based on how the adver-
sary is allowed to define the scenarios, i.e. choose the
batches. We restrict her choice, and she has to pro-
vide two scenarios that are equal in the information
that is not confidential, and hence allowed to leak.
They may only differ in information that is required
to be hidden, so her guess depends on her ability to
learn protected information.
Creating a hierarchy, the adversary is not restricted
in the definition of the strongest goal, Communi-
cation Unobservability (CŌ): Anything, even how
many communications are happening, has to be hid-
den.
While CŌ protects both senders and receivers, Re-
ceiver Unobservability (RŌ) is the strongest goal that
only protects the receivers. Everything about the
senders and their messages can be learned by the ad-
versary and hence is required to be equal in both
scenarios.
Similarly, Sender Unobservability (SŌ) is the
strongest goal that only protects the senders. Ev-
erything about the receivers and their messages can
be learned by the adversary and hence is required to
be equal in both scenarios.
Relaxing SŌ, the weaker goal Extended Sender-
Message Unlinkability26 (SML̄) allows the adversary
to learn how many messages each sender sends in
addition to everything about the receivers and mes-
sages. So the (real message) sending frequency of a
sender has to be the same as of this sender in the
other scenario.
25We use ”scenario” to refer the challenge scenarios as in the
Counting-Bound [15] and address different properties of users
and attackers as ”settings”, contrary to calling them “scenar-
ios” like in the Trilemma [11].
26SML̄ is called Sender-Message Unlinkability in [18].
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Sender-Message Unlinkability27 ((SM)L̄) is one of
the weakest sender goals. It protects only the fact
that a message and its sender belong together. The
second scenario is entirely equal to the first in this
case, except that the senders of two communica-
tions with the same receiver are exchanged. Sim-
ilarly, Sender-Receiver Unlinkability2 ((SR)L̄) only
protects the fact that a sender and receiver communi-
cate together. So, the senders of two communications
with the same message are switched in the scenarios.
For the goal Message Unobservability with Message
Unlinkability (MŌ[ML̄]), we require that how many
messages each sender sends and each receiver receives
is equal and does not have to be hidden.
A.2 Definitions
We explain slightly simplified versions of the defini-
tions from [18] and add a relaxation SOnmax . r =
(u, u′,m, aux) denotes a communication, i.e. message
m is send from u to u′ with auxiliary information aux.
Multiple communications are grouped into batches r.
Notions are defined by stating which batches r0, r1
have to be indistinguishable, i.e. are allowed to be
chosen by the adversary for the challenge.
To define the notions we use r0, r1 for the batches
in question, which for b ∈ {0, 1} contain communica-
tions
rbj ∈ {(ubj , u′bj ,mbj , auxbj ),♦}
where ♦ denotes that no communication is happen-
ing.
CO: All batches r0, r1 are valid.
MO[ML :] Let Qb := {(u, n) | u sends n mes-
sages in rb} denote how many messages
each sender sends and Q′b how many each
receiver receives. The batches r0, r1 are




1, ♦ 6∈ r0 and
♦ 6∈ r1.
RO: The batches are valid iff for all j:
r1j = (u0j , u
′
1j ,m0j , aux0j ).
27(SM)L̄ is called Pair-Sender-Message Unlinkability,
(SR)L̄: Pair-Sender-Receiver Unlinkability in [18].
SO: The batches are valid iff for all j:
r1j = (u1j , u
′
0j ,m0j , aux0j ).
SOnmax : The batches are valid iff for all j:
r1j = (u1j , u
′
0j ,m0j , aux0j ) and for b ∈
{0, 1} for all (u, n) ∈ Qb: n ≤ nmax.
SML: The batches are valid iff for all j:
r1j = (u1j , u
′
0j ,m0j , aux0j ) and Q0 = Q1.
(SM)L: Let MSM specify that only the senders
of two messages are swapped in the two
batches (see Fig. 4). Batches are valid iff
for all j:
r1j = (u1j , u
′
0j ,m1j , aux0j ) and MSM is
true.
(SR)L: similar to (SM)L.
A      m A      m'
C      m' C      m
A      m A      m'





batch 0 batch 1
Figure 4: Batches in MSM illustrated as in [19]
Single Setting For reasons of compatibility with
the analyzed papers, we extend [18] by introducing
an X1 for each notion X. It expresses that every
sender sends exactly once in each batch for a sender
notion (SŌ, (SM)L̄), each receiver receives exactly
once for a receiver notion (RŌ), and each sender and
receiver send/receive exactly once in each batch for
an impartial notion (CŌ, (SR)L̄).
Formally, the extensionX1 is defined to any notion
X as for any
sender notion for all b ∈ {0, 1}, (u, q) ∈ Qb : q =
1, i.e. all users send exactly once in
the batch.
receiver notion for all b ∈ {0, 1}, (u, q) ∈ Q′b : q =
1, i.e. all users receive exactly once
in the batch.
impartial notion for all b ∈ {0, 1}, (u, q) ∈ Qb ∪Q′b :
q = 1, i.e. all users send and receive
exactly once in the batch.
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Note that this only expresses weaker privacy goals
and in terms of bounds this means, the bound for the
goal without this extension is also valid, but slightly
less precise.
A.3 Introducing additional restric-
tions
The framework introduces additional concepts: It
allows to use the observations of multiple batches.
Thus, the game adversary can decide on the next
batch after observing the output to the current batch.
A batch is thereby understood as a sequence of com-
munications, but the semantics of a batch are not
defined further in [18]. For this work, we understand
a batch as communications that start in an unpre-
dictable order, at least for the adversary. The easiest
way is to think of them being initiated simultaneously
or in a random order. Formally, this requires using a
random permutation over all communications of the
batch.
The second concept is called number of chal-
lenges. It measures how different the two sequences
of batches are in terms of how often e.g. in SŌ the
senders differ or how many sender pairs have been
switched in (SM)L̄. Further, the number of challenge
rows counts the number of differing communications
between the scenarios.
A third additional concept are corruption restric-
tions. Here we are interested in Xce , that specifies
that the messages that are sent and received by cor-
rupted users have to be equal in both scenarios as
otherwise the adversary could trivially break the no-
tion by observing the behavior at corrupted users.
Formally, let Û denote the set of corrupted users: for
all û ∈ Û and all communications rbj with û as sender
or receiver: m1j = m0j .
A.4 Comparing advantage definitions
The advantage definitions of the papers are equiva-
lent. We show equivalence mostly with simple trans-
formations. Only the Dropping-Bound represents a
slight exception, but also its chosen total variation
distance can be shown equivalent using known re-
sults [10].
Detailed Comparison
We use Pr[g = A|C(b)] short for the probability that
the attacker A guesses g when the challenger C picked
random bit b.
Counting-Bound This definition requires the
probability that any adversary algorithm A correctly
guesses that bit b = 1 (Pr[1 = A|C(1)]), is only negli-
gibly bigger than the same algorithm guessing b = 1
incorrectly (Pr[1 = A|C(0)]). So, the adversary has
only a negligible advantage δ in winning the game.
Pr[1 = A|C(1)]− Pr[1 = A|C(0)] ≤ δ
Optimality-Bound The definition of the adver-
sary’s attack advantage δ in the Optimality-Bound
can be shown to be equivalent, under the assumption
that the adversary always guesses something, with
simple transformations:
δCounting−Bound = Pr(1|1)− Pr(1|0)
= Pr(1|1)− (1− Pr(0|0))
= 2 · (0.5 · Pr(0|0) + 0.5 · Pr(1|1))− 1
= 2 · Pr(b|b)− 1 = δOptimality−Bound
Trilemma The Trilemma uses a definition similar
to the Counting-Bound’s as follows:
Pr[0 = A|C(0)] ≤ Pr[0 = A|C(1)] + δ
Note that in comparison to the Counting-Bound’s
here only the bits are changed. Technically, the ad-
vantage definition has to be fulfilled for any PPT
adversary. Hence, if there is an adversary violating
the definition of the Counting-Bound, we can simply
swap its chosen scenarios and invert the output bit
and we have an adversary violating the definition of
the Trilemma and similarly for the other way round.
Dropping-Bound This anonymity defines two
scenarios to be indistinguishable iff the statistical dis-
tance between the observation of the adversary is
negligible in the security parameter. As measure for
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the statistical distance the total variation distance
(∆TV (·, ·)) is used.
∆TV (VA|C(0), VA|C(1)) ≤ δ
From [10] (Equation 8) we know that this total
variance based definition and the differential pri-
vacy based (0, δ)-closeness definition of [10] are in-
terchangeable. Further, the (0, δ)-closeness defini-
tion is defined as the outputs of the mechanism,
i.e. the input to the game adversary, being indistin-
guishable, just as the probabilities in the definition
of the Counting-Bound and Trilemma: VA|C(0) ≤
VA|C(1) + δ.
Thus, the only remaining difference between the
definitions is that the Dropping-Bound’s is talking
about the probability distributions in the views of
the game adversary, while the Counting-Bound’s is
talking about all possible game adversary algorithms.
However, if the difference of the probability distribu-
tions in the views is negligible, so is the chance of
any adversary to distinguish them. Also, if there is
an adversary that can distinguish the scenarios, then
the probability distributions in the views have to be
non-negligibly different.
A.5 Comparing additional restric-
tions
Corrupted users The Dropping-Bound intro-
duces the additional restriction that corrupted users
send and receive the same messages in both scenar-
ios, as the scenarios would otherwise be trivially dis-
tinguishable. Formally, this matches the corruption
restriction and leads to (SR)L̄1,ce . For our compar-
ison we can however simply add this restriction to
all notions. For the other bounds it does not change
anything as it is already always fulfilled: all senders
are assumed to be honest and the receivers have to
receive the same messages per notion definition.
Allowed number of challenge rows The
Trilemma28 and Dropping-Bound need only two dif-
28Even though the Trilemma [11]’s privacy notion formally
allows just one communication to differ, its attack is, in combi-
nation with the assumption that every user sends exactly one
message, not possible with only one differing communication.
fering communications (the ones whose senders are
switched) in the compared scenarios. Thus, the no-
tions of the Trilemma and Dropping-Bound are also
in this regard weaker than the one of the Counting-
Bound where multiple (precisely µmax) differing com-
munications are needed for the attack.
Further, the protocol model of the Trilemma allows
only one user to send a real message per round and
this permutation over the users is assumed to be cho-
sen randomly. This fits our understanding of batches:
The order, in which the chosen communications are
input to the protocol model, is random.
B Tightening the claims
First, we make the effects of assumptions explicit
by incorporating them into the analyzed dimensions.
Thereby, we do not technically change any result, but
allow to understand the real strength of the results
better. Secondly, by in depth analysis of the proofs,
we found that the proofs work for even weaker as-
sumptions than those that had been made, and in
one case, we improved the calculations for the over-
head.
B.1 Adversary Models
All papers assume global eavesdropping capabilities.
However, as the actual attacks consider only one or
two victim senders, we can reduce the global adver-




For these attacks the adversary only has to be able to
notice when or how often the victim sends. In the in-
tegrated system model she has thus to be able to dis-
tinguish sending events from forwarding events. As
a technicality the adversary in the proofs can decide
that the victims do not receive any message. As thus
29This can be achieved trivially by their ISP, and probably
easily by an attacking insider, who controls the nodes that are
connected by the adjacent links.
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Table 3: Comparison of notations, N.A.: not applicable (concept does not exist/does not apply), -: no
defined symbol
Our Trilemma Counting-Bound Optimality-Bound Dropping-Bound
UH N.A. H N.A. -
h - h N.A. -
ca N.A. N.A. N.A. κN
cp c N.A. N.A N.A.
lmax l + 1 N.A N.A. N.A.
lexp N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
r N.A. R N.A. N.A
σ0, σ1 N.A. σ0, σ1 M̄
(0), M̄ (1) σ0, σ1
U , ui S, ui [n], pi or Si Pi -






λ η (δ ≤ neg(η)) k (Adv ≤ negl(k)) k λ










N∗R li = µN −
∑
j∈[n] |mi,j | N.A.
≈ ovh(T )/n = µN
b b b b b
n N n n N
Out(r) ≈ p′ · r ·N Outπσ,R - -
all inbound packets must be followed by forwarding
events, the adversary learns the number of real send-
ing events by subtracting the outgoing packets from
the inbound.
Dropping-Bound
For the bound the only active adversarial capacity
needed is dropping, although their attacker model
states multiple active capabilities (delay, create, mod-
ify and drop messages).
B.2 Dropping-Bound – Privacy No-
tion
The Dropping-Bound defines its own privacy goal
without relation to other work. In its anonymity def-
inition the game adversary is30 not restricted in how
she chooses the scenarios. Therefore, the described
notion matches communication unobservability CO,
the strongest notion in the hierarchy.
Additionally to the anonymity definition the goal
is however restricted by the ”simple I/O setting”, i.e.
30except for the behavior of corrupted users that does
not hinder our comparison as we discuss separately in Ap-
pendix A.5
each participant sends and receives exactly one mes-
sage. This restriction is equivalent to fixing the num-
ber of sending and receiving events to 1, which is the
exact definition of MŌ[ML̄]1 (see Appendix A.1), an
already weaker impartial notion of the hierarchy.
The attack used in the proof breaks for an even
weaker notion. As it ignores message contents, we
can use the same message in all communications.
Further, we can define the second scenario equal to
the first, with only the one sender u0 that sends to
the observed receiver switched with the alternative
sender u1 that sends to another receiver. Thereby,
only the linking between those senders and receivers
differs and the definition of (SR)L̄1 is met.
Interestingly, this is one of the weakest notions in
the hierarchy. The bound is thus much stronger than
the anonymity definition suggested (the strongest no-
tion in the hierarchy), as their calculated cost is not
only necessary to achieve a very strong privacy def-
inition, but also if only the linking between sender
and receiver is aimed to be protected (see Figure 5).
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Table 4: Overview used parameters
Parameter Meaning
n number of nodes / participants
UH set of honest senders
h number of honest senders, |UH |
ca number of actively compromised nodes
cp number of passively compromised (inter-
mediate) nodes






lmax latency, maximal delay of a message, the
maximal number of rounds between the
sending of a message and its reception
lexp expected delay of a message, average num-
ber of rounds between the sending of a mes-
sage and its reception
r number of rounds a certain metric or anal-
ysis refers to
β bandwidth-overhead,
probability of one node to send a dummy
message in a given round
p′ probability of one node to send a real mes-
sage in a given round
p p = p′ + β, probability to send any type of
message
Out(r) delivered messages until round r
B.3 Trilemma
We discuss the used privacy notion and tighten the
bound in terms of needed overhead.
Privacy Notion
The Trilemma uses sender anonymity from AnoA,
which maps directly to SO. This means that the two
scenarios can arbitrarily differ in the senders, but in
nothing else.
For the synchronous user distribution it is however
additionally assumed that everyone can only send ex-
actly one real message. Similarly to the Dropping-
Bound before, this means that the frequency with
which a sender sends needs not to be hidden, as it
is identical in both scenarios. This is equal to the
definition of SML1 (see Appendix A.1).
The analyzed notion in the proof, as opposed to the






















goal with respect to additionally stated assumptions
goal actually broken by suggested attack
Figure 5: The mapping of the anonymity notions to
the hierarchy of privacy notions from [18]: The no-
tions used for the bound differ from the anonymity
definition given due to additional assumptions. Fur-
ther, the notions needed in the proofs are even weaker
than the notions that follow from the additional as-
sumptions. For a simplified summarizing presenta-
tion, we neglect the additionally restriction (X1) that
the Trilemma and the Dropping-Bound introduce for
the notions MO[ML], SML, (SM)L and (SR)L.
assumptions, of the synchronized model changes how-
ever only the sender of the challenge message (with
some other sender31). This matches the definition of
(SM)L̄1 as only the connection between two senders
and messages is changed and every sender sends one
message.
31This is not made explicit, but has to be done to respect
the assumption of every sender sending exactly one message.
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In the unsynchronized model, it is assumed that
each user wants to send messages. This time the
number of messages is not fixed by the notion, but
neither can it be chosen by the adversary. Every
time the coin flip decides that the user has to send a
message, she is assumed to have one ready to send.
As again the only difference allowed is the change of
senders for the challenge message, this translates to
(SM)L̄.
Similarly to the Dropping-Bound we see that even
though a pretty strong notion was stated in the be-
ginning, the suggested attack breaks one of the weak-
est notions defined; the notion that only protects the
linking between sender and message, but keeps any-
thing else identical (see Figure 5).
Bound
The idea of the proof in the unsynchronized case is
simple: An adversary knows that the sender of the
critical message has sent in the lmax − 1 rounds be-
fore she received this message. Thus, if one of the two
victim senders did not sent in these rounds, we know
the other must have been the sender, as the only un-
certainty the adversary has left is which of those two
candidate users was the sender. Therefore, the ad-
versary wins, i.e. learns the sender, if the alternative
sender did not send.
The authors perform intricate calculations, intro-
ducing random variables, the Chernoff bound and
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, 1− (1− p)lmax−1
)
and can be even easier understood as:
δ ≥ max
(
0, (1− p)lmax−1 − 1
2
)
However, considering that we only need to bound
the probability that the other user does not send, we
claim that an easier and more accurate bound is:
δ ≥ (1− p)lmax−1
We know that with probability 1−p the alternative
user does not send in one round. As the sending in
the rounds are independent (as stated in [11]), (1 −
p)lmax−1 is the probability that the user does not send
in any of the rounds.
With this difference, we adapt the argumentation
of [11] (which we explain intuitively together with the
other bounds in Section 4.5) for the extended case
with compromised protocol parties as well and result


























if cp < lmax − 1
C Delayed Comparisons
C.1 Optimality-Bound vs. Counting-
Bound
The Optimality-Bound[17]: Hevia and Miccianchio
investigated performance optimality of ACN protocol
transformations against a global passive adversary. A
transformation is a technique that can be added to
a protocol achieving a weak privacy goal to create
a stronger protocol. They prove a transformation
optimal; thus stating a performance bound.
C.1.1 Privacy Goal
They use the same definition of protected communi-
cation properties and as stated above the advantage
definition is equivalent.
C.1.2 Bound
The Optimality-Boundproves optimality of a proto-
col transformation: The overhead ovh of each such
protocol transformation τ has to ensure that each of
the n possible senders is sending the maximum num-
ber of messages µmax. This leads to n · µmax send
events:
ovh(τ) ≥ n · µmax
As µmax messages are delivered Out(r) = µmax.
The total number of messages sent are Com(r) =
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ovh(τ). Since there are no corrupted users h = n.
From this we conclude equality to the Counting-
Bound:
ovh(τ) ≥ n·µmax ⇐⇒ Com(r) ≥ n·Out(r) = h·Out(r)
C.2 Trilemma’s Compromising adver-
sary
Extending the adversary to compromise up to cp ≤
n−2 intermediate nodes facilitates the attack of trac-
ing messages along their anonymization paths, if all
nodes on these paths are under adversarial control.
This increases the advantage of the adversary, and
the Trilemma is interested in this additional proba-
bility for an attack to succeed. We use K to denote
the number of protocol parties throughout this sec-
tion and discuss the synchronized user setting in the
following.





(lmax − 1)(1 + βn)
n− 1
)
According to [11] we define the last part (the prob-
ability that a certain user has sent a message in the
lmax − 1 rounds) to be
fβ(lmax − 1) := min
(
1,




For corrupted intermediaries, [11] distinguishes two
cases. The adversary either has a chance to com-
promise all relays on the anonymization path of the
challenge message as she has corrupted enough re-
lays, or not. The authors simplify the first case
and bound the probability that the challenge or al-
ternative messages can be traced with the prob-


















and an alternative message is sent








fβ(lmax − 1). As she wins in
the complement to this event, her advantage in this










)) fβ(lmax − 1).
In the second case, not all intermediate nodes can
be corrupted. Note that for the adversary to win
it suffices to track all alternative messages until the
challenge message is received (as she can exclude
them). The adversary hence loses if an alternative
message is sent and an honest relay is on the path
that this message shares with the challenge message.
There is an honest relay on this path if the message
traversed more relays (>cp) than the adversary can
compromise (fβ(lmax−1−cp)). However, there might
also be an honest relay on this path if the path is
shorter (consisting of ≤ cp relays). This event is at
most as likely as having an honest relay in exactly





. As a shorter path occurs with
probability fβ(cp), the adversary loses at most with






The adversary wins in the complementary event, so








fβ(cp)− fβ(lmax − 1− cp).






















fβ(cp) − fβ(lmax − 1 − cp) cp < lmax − 1
For the unsynchronized setting the same ideas are
applied on the basis of the non-compromising bound
for the unsynchronized setting (cf. Appendix D.1).
As for the non-compromising case, the above
bounds induce an area of impossibility for the com-
promising adversary. If an adversary passively com-
promises cp < lmax−1 protocol parties, then the area
of impossibility is





If the number of compromised nodes is cp ≥ lmax − 1,
then anonymity cannot be reached for
2(lmax − 1)β ≤ 1−
1
poly(λ)
and lmax ∈ O(1).
D Proofs
D.1 Improving the Trilemma
Case 1: cp ≥ lmax − 1 This means all interme-
diate nodes chosen in the lmax − 1 rounds could be
corrupted. As for the synchronous behavior, the at-











). He also wins if the
alternative user does not sent ((1 − p)lmax−1). So,
her advantage can be bound by the complementary











) and the probability that the















Case 2: cp < lmax− 1 This means not all interme-
diate nodes are corrupted. As for the synchronous be-
havior, the attacker wins except if an alternative and
the challenge message share long path (so long that
an honest node has to be on it) (1−(1−p)lmax−1−cp)
or there are only alternative messages that share
short paths (and none that shares a long path)32
((1− p)lmax−1−cp(1− (1− p)cp)) but an honest node






δ ≥ 1 −
(
1 − (1 − p)lmax−1−cp
)
− (1 − p)lmax−1−cp
[
1 − (1 − p)cp
] 1 − 1/(K
cp
)
= (1 − p)lmax−1−cp − (1 − p)lmax−1−cp
[
1 − (1 − p)cp










32Note that this is a tighter estimation as the one of syn-
chronized user setting, where the probability of a short shared
path(fβ(cp)) is used (and the existence of further alternative
messages is neglected).
D.2 Impossibility areas
Relations between variables The number of
send messages Com(r) are the dummy messages (β
messages per user and round ) and real messages that
are delivered (Out(r)).
Com(r) = βnr +Out(r)
Transformation Using our discovered relation be-
tween the variables and the Trilemma’s assumption
that n ≈ poly(λ) we can transform the Counting-
Bound:
Com(r) ≥ Out(r) · n
βnr +Out(r) ≥ Out(r) · poly(λ)









and the impossibility area of the Trilemma:






D.3 No latency in the Trilemma
Using lmax = 1 yields:















unsynchronized (improved): δ ≥ (1− p)0 = 1
E Receiver Privacy Goals
Both the Optimality-Bound as well as the Trilemma
also consider receiver privacy goals.
The analysis for the Optimality-Bound is consis-
tent to its bound for SŌ: if any user receives less
than the total number of real messages, she is ex-
cluded from the anonymity set. Both sender and re-
ceiver bounds hence are equal, and RŌ can only be
achieved with high bandwidth overhead; for instance,
by implementing a broadcast.
The Trilemma also adapts its original attack to
identify receivers: The adversary observes the send-
ing of the challenge message and concludes that the
message can only be received by someone who re-
ceives a message within the next lmax rounds. If
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enough relays are corrupted, the message can be
traced. Interestingly, the resulting bound postulates
a lower cost than for the senders. Attacking the
sender, the candidate messages are only those sent
within the lmax rounds before the challenge message
is received. Attacking the receiver, the candidate set
expands to those messages sent during the lmax − 1
rounds before, and the lmax− 1 rounds after sending
the challenge message. All could have caused a mes-
sage reception during the critical period, depending
on how the protocol determines the latency for each
message. We hypothesize that future work might im-
prove this bound to match the sender case, because
not even an optimal protocol can be able to ensure
that all messages always end up being received in the
critical period33.
F Note on related results
It is interesting to note, that researchers on the phys-
ical layer defined privacy goals that are similar, and
identified the same bound as the Optimality- and the
Counting-Bound [29]. Assuming the lack of a shared
secret, they additionally analyze how much shared
randomness is needed between the users.
Oya et al. analyze how a given amount of dummy
traffic should be spent in pool mix networks to opti-
mally improve their privacy [24]. This differs in two
ways from the analyses we systematized in this work:
First, their privacy measure considers a mean over
all users. This is conceptually different from game-
based approaches, which always consider the worst-
case user or user-pair. Second, they do not give a
bound on dummy messages required to achieve a cer-
tain privacy goal, but show how to best use a dummy
traffic budget.
33As receiving all these messages in one lmax interval im-
plies that less receive events occurred during the lmax interval
before.
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